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Which State for Which Sovereignty?
Qual estado para qual soberania?
Pierre Vercauteren*
Abstract
This paper analyses the question of what sovereignty refers to in contemporary world. Starting from 
Robert Keohane’s article entitled “Ironies of Sovereignty: the European Union and the United States”, 
this paper investigates the evolutions and characteristics of sovereignty in the EU and the USA through 
the contribution of Norberto Bobio’s typology, and how sovereignty can be affected by the different 
conceptions on the State. This leads to evaluate the convergence between the European Union and 
the United States on the conception of sovereignty. Based on such comparison, this article raises 
the hypothesis of a “multilevel sovereignty” of States facing growing common pressures from the 
international system.
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Resumo
Este trabalho analisa a questão sobre o que se entende por soberania no mundo contemporâneo. 
Partindo do artigo de Robert Keohane intitulado “Ironies of Sovereignty: the European Union and the 
United States”, este trabalho investiga a evolução e características da soberania na UE e nos EUA a partir 
da contribuição da tipologia de Norberto Bobbio, e como a soberania pode ser afetada pelas diferentes 
concepções de Estado. Isto nos leva a avaliar a convergência entre as concepções de União Europeia e 
Estados Unidos acerca da soberania. Baseada nesta comparação, este artigo levanta a hipótese de uma 
“soberania multi-nível” dos Estados que enfrentam uma crescente de pressões comuns do sistema 
internacional.
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1 Introduction
In contemporary international relations, the issue of sovereignty is one of the most 
debated. Very often it is raised in terms of erosion(Trimble, 1997; Taylor, 2015) or end of 
sovereignty (Camilleri and Falk, 1992). Such a debate seems to be going on for years without 
any clear cut final answer. This is especially so as today’s world is characterized by a growing 
complexity, among others with Rosenau’s observation of the proliferation of spheres of 
authority (Rosenau, 2009). However some observers try to enlarge the debate. In his article 
entitled “Ironies of Sovereignty: the European Union and the United States”, Robert Keohane 
observes how the United States and European Union’s approaches to sovereignty have evolved 
differently (Keohane, 2002). The author highlights the strengthening of the American attitude 
in respect of sovereignty, while the European States, by contrast, move towards relaxing the 
concept. This article revives the debate surrounding the relevance of sovereignty in international 
relations. In the context of an interdependent world and of globalization, three aspects of 
sovereignty can be observed on the basis of Keohane’s reflections:
—   contrary to the position held in particular by Bertrand Badie(Badie, 1999) asserting that 
sovereignty has come to an end, in reality it remains important internationally;
—   sovereignty is evolving;
—   it has multiple manifestations: Keohane highlights three types of sovereignty: external, 
unitary and “pooled” (shared).
This logically leads us to ask what sovereignty refers to today.
While the debate in respect of sovereignty in international relations is often couched in 
terms of “more” or “less”, Keohane focuses upon the formal (legal) dimension of sovereignty. In 
his opinion, sovereignty cannot be considered a fiction in any circumstances. The problem posed 
by Keohane’s positions on the one hand and by those of Badie on the other resides in the fact 
that they are not operating on the same plane: while Keohane anchors his observation upon the 
formalities of sovereignty, Badie concentrates upon the reality of the fact of sovereignty and 
its political consequences. Keohane, however, means to maintain a distance from the issue of 
“more” or “less” as regards sovereignty. However, it is possible to move slightly outside this 
debate by postulating that the developing dimension of sovereignty should not only refer to its 
relaxation or strengthening. Its evolution can also be synonymous with transformation, as the 
shared or pooled sovereignty hypothesis suggests. If, to take up James Rosenau’s observation, 
Keohane and Badie’s points of view are, beyond the intellectual differences bound to the two 
commentators’ temperaments, two ways of observing the same, multi-faceted reality, i.e. the 
legal dimension and factual dimension, we can advance a hypothesis for connecting the two 
aspects, after a fashion, by considering them to be the two sides of the same coin. 
To that end, is it not appropriate to consider the legal dimension of sovereignty as 
the product of political decisions or relationships arising from negotiations and/or wars? 
Sovereignty is therefore a formalized social construct (Biesteker and Weber, 1996) whose 
reality is dependent upon being accepted by political actors (both internally and externally), 
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whether they are the political decision-makers or members of the relevant political community 
often referred to using the generic term “nation”. That construct meets the three conditions 
for sovereignty discussed by Stephen Krasner: autonomy, control and recognition (Krasner, 
2001). Sovereignty is, in fact, the expression of the actors’ will to adopt rules of behavior for 
an organized and peaceful society; a means of departing or protecting themselves from the 
“bellum omnium contra omnes”. Without denying the formal dimension, the reality of which 
is still relevant today, sovereignty can therefore be assessed on the basis of its consequences, 
just as it is possible to assess the processes involved in the development of law and political, 
economic or social factors influencing its emergence, but also the results arising from it in 
reality. So, if nothing in international public law allows the formal character of a State’s 
sovereignty to be called into question, the factual dimension of its operation can be subject 
to debate. For example: to what extent is a small State, which clearly has legal sovereignty, in 
a position to exercise the full extent of that sovereignty while subject to significant external 
restrictions of various kinds (economic, financial, political, security-related...). Since the end 
of the 90’s, can the Republic of Serbia credibly assert that it does in fact fully exercise its 
sovereignty while UN forces are still stationed in Kosovo and while Kosovo is recognized as an 
independent State by no less than 111 States in the world? 
The hypothesis that formal sovereignty is considered as the product of a political 
process allows the role of political decision-makers to be included in reflections on this topic, 
particularly as regards their notions of the State. The relevant question then is to what extent 
do the political decision-makers’ notions of the State on either side of the Atlantic (if we 
adopt Keohane’s approach to the question) influence their approach to sovereignty? And if 
we expand upon that reflection, to what extent do the differences in the approaches to 
sovereignty observed between the USA and Europe lead to evolution towards (and are we 
not already seeing) a certain convergence of the two in the future? And if that is the case 
what features allow us to draw the outline for a common model for sovereignty? In order to 
investigate this hypothesis, we will first call upon Norberto Bobbio’s typology relating to notions 
of the State (Bobbio, 2001). The US and EU approaches will be compared on that basis. We can 
then tackle the question of the likely convergence of the two analyzed entities’ approaches 
to sovereignty. The preceding two steps will allow us to determine the features of a common 
model for sovereignty.
2 The contribution of Norberto Bobbio’s typology
In his work “L’État et la Démocratie Internationale” (The State and International 
Democracy), Bobbio discusses two approaches to the State: one positive, the other negative. 
Proponents of the positive approach view the State in the context of all the advantages 
it can bring to the development of individuals and the community. If, by their logic, this 
approach comprises an aspiration to expand State institutions, and even, in an extreme 
utopian hypothesis, the materialization of a universal State, then this aspiration might 
present two different implications for State actors as regards sovereignty. On the one hand, 
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the confirmation of the importance of the State’s role might mean that it is more important 
than all the external influences being exercised upon the State (e.g.: interdependence, 
growing importance of international rules,...) so not challenging but rather strengthening 
sovereignty. Looked at this way it is an instrument or condition which should allow the State 
to fulfil its functions (relating to social and economic cohesion and security) in the way which 
is most advantageous to the development of individuals and the community. This leads to 
a situation where the center of gravity for international relations remains with the State, 
thereby limiting the likelihood of the other possible implication of the positive approach. In 
this second implication, the development of human abilities requires the State dimension to 
be progressively exceeded, with the supra or inter-State level proving to be more relevant for 
this purpose. The State must therefore reconsider its sovereignty from a more limited point 
of view or from the perspective of pooling in order to favor the deployment of supra-State or 
international projects.
The negative notion of the State can itself be subdivided into two branches of opinion, 
one “weak” according to which the State is a “necessary evil”, and the other “strong”, seeing 
the State as an “unnecessary evil”. The “unnecessary evil” hypothesis in relation to the State 
can be seen in the criticism of failures, deficiencies and dysfunction on the part of public figures: 
a crisis of confidence as regards national or supranational public institutions, a reaction to 
bureaucratic or technocratic influences lacking in transparency and evading democratic control, 
etc.. This hypothesis might prefigure the end of all State institutions and foresee the advent 
of an anarchical society. Currently this appears to be the least plausible eventuality. The 
numerous critics making themselves heard when various crises occur which affect the State, 
reveal aspirations relating to the revitalization of public figures and more efficient governance, 
this aspiration also being seen from the perspective of a State with reduced functions but most 
of all functions which are more efficiently fulfilled. These critics do not suggest at all that the 
State should disappear. 
The “necessary evil” State alternative provides a pessimistic notion of the State operator 
whose reason for being resides in the necessity to preserve an order in the community, 
within which wickedness and arbitrariness would otherwise reign. The idea behind it is that 
“the State is better than anarchy” (Bobbio, 2001, 264). It implies that the State should be 
as small as possible. Following the example of the positive approach to the State, this idea 
can lead to two attitudes as regards sovereignty: one considers that sovereignty constitutes 
a minimum, inevitable basis which should allow the State to work against or avoid anarchy1, 
the other, which poses no particular opposition to the first, considers that, faced with growing 
external constraints acting upon the State, it is important that, from an efficiency perspective, 
sovereignty can be the subject of certain pooling so far as that does not challenge the minimum 
size which the State, or any substitute or partial alternative (EU, UN, WTO,...) must maintain2. 
1 In this case, sovereignty cannot be invoked by the State in order to extend its field of intervention.
2 We should highlight that amongst these models there lies a series of variations which are more similar to one or another of the 
models as appropriate. Additionally, there is nothing to exclude the development of the notion of a political community or of 
political decision makers from one model to another over the course of history.
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3 What are the United States’ and European Union’s notions of the State?
We can demonstrate the difference between the United States and the European Union 
by applying Bobbio’s typology. In the United States, the notion of the State which has emerged 
is the weak negative approach: the State is considered a necessary evil. This emergence can 
be explained by historical reasons. The founders of the American republic were motivated by the 
desire to make a break from the intolerance and absolutism of European power. It is therefore 
a minimal State which intervenes as little as possible in citizens’ lives, but whose sovereignty 
is strengthened in order to protect or defend the American model and American interests as 
regards security threats and certain negative effects of globalization. From this perspective, 
American sovereignty can be seen as essentially defensive. 
European relationships with sovereignty are more complex, not only as a result of a 
different historical evolution over the last two centuries, but also because two approaches to 
the State coexist within the EU: the positive approach (with its two possible branches) and 
the weak negative approach. But these two approaches are combined around the dominant 
reference model in Europe: the changing welfare state. The European approach to sovereignty 
is therefore simultaneously defensive (seen as a means of protection against external threats) 
and open (due to a certain amount of advantageous pooling: for example, that is the logic 
behind the ECSC).
We can therefore ask how the differences between the two sides of the Atlantic 
in relation to sovereignty can be explained, when, as Mark Gilbert highlights (Gilbert, 2004), 
Americans and Europeans have a large, joint foundation, both as regards politics (democracy) 
and economics (market economy), etc.. In addition to the historical evolution discussed 
in Keohane’s article, two other considerations can be advanced which are linked to ideas of 
power and sovereignty. At this stage of reflection it is important to approach this question on 
two levels: the first calling upon the concept of power and international relations theories, the 
second returning to the idea of the elites and their relationship with sovereignty. Analyzed from 
these two perspectives, the United States are constituting a power which became classical in 
the “realist” sense of international relations theories (Dougherthy and Pfaltzgraff, 1990; Telò, 
2008). This evolution implies a strengthening of American sovereignty. However, this is a grey 
area. It is indeed possible to see a certain duality within the United States. The United States 
is considered by many analysts as having an “imperialist” policy in relation to other countries 
(Boniface, 2003) in accordance with the White House’s dual motivations: on the one hand, there 
are reasons which fall within “realist” ideas relating to international relations, defense and 
national interests, and, on the other hand, a very “constructivist” (Dogherty and Pfaltzgraff, 
1999) approach to international relationships, in this instance by exporting democracy across the 
world. Yet, internally, the United States is a very lively democracy. However, due in particular 
to the 11 September 2001 attacks, we should highlight a hardening in the area of sovereignty, 
in its external and internal dimensions, in the sense of a strengthening of unitary sovereignty.
For its part, the European Union is motivated by the will, on the basis of historical reasons, 
to move away from the concept of classical power and therefore lends itself less to the “realist” 
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school. However, different nuances and even approaches lie behind this apparent consensus. 
Grosso modo it is possible to identify two categories of State: a) the former dominant classical 
powers (e.g. France, England...) which, in their external sovereignty dealings demonstrate 
that they still have an attachment to protecting certain attributes of sovereignty as much as 
possible; b) certain small powers which, like Belgium, are more open to the pooling of attributes 
of sovereignty. There is no avoiding the fact that, despite these differences, more evidence 
for Keohane’s hypothesis that sovereignty is changing due to pooling is emerging. However, 
behind this common sovereignty model, we can observe the different political agendas within 
the EU (for example the different approaches of Eurosceptics and Europhiles). This pooling of 
sovereignty is also accompanied by an aspiration on the part of the EU to embody an essentially 
peaceful “civil power” (Hoffmann, 1999; Sjursen, 2006). 
This brief comparison allows us to highlight a certain convergence in the ideas or 
attitudes in the United States and the former dominant European powers. This convergence 
demonstrates an aspect of the contemporary reality of sovereignty: the USA, as the new 
classical power, and the former “classical” European powers (with the exception of Germany 
for historical reasons) aspire to entire or partial unitary sovereignty more than others. This 
suggests that a link could be established on the one hand between the “realist” international 
relations theories which postulate the hierarchy of powers and, on the other hand, each power’s 
attitude in the hierarchy as regards sovereignty. In summary, this observation can be expressed 
as follows: can be sovereign whoever holds the means of power. In other words, sovereignty 
is linked to the “ability to remain sovereign” in spite of external constraints. This is what 
Stephen Krasner emphasizes by citing autonomy as a constitutive element of sovereignty. 
But the United States differs from the European Union here too. Nowadays the USA has many 
more means of exercising its sovereignty (both relating to the economy and to security) and 
can therefore, in terms of an “informal” recognition of Krasner’s criteria, claim it with more 
credibility than European States.
Aside from that difference, there is common ground between the USA and Europe. Today, 
no State can claim watertight sovereignty particularly due to the growing porosity of state 
borders (Badie, 1995). Additionally, State operators cannot claim absolute sovereignty in the 
face of many different issues (economics, security, environment,...) which they are no longer 
in a position to tackle alone. For eg, George W Bush certainly championed very sovereignist 
policies, including using alliances on a case by case basis and favoring bilateral links as part 
of his foreign policy. But this approach met certain limitations in the form of NATO and WTO 
rules, for example. The Bush administration considered multilateralism as something to be 
avoided so far as possible in as much as it appears to exercise greater constraints over American 
sovereignty. In this perspective, he remained basically in line with many US presidents during 
those last decades. For its part, the EU takes a much more multilateral approach, even if certain 
differences falling into the categories discussed earlier persist in relation to sovereignty. Certain 
States, which are former classical powers, remain anxious to preserve an independent foreign 
policy. However, it remains the fact, both for the USA and the EU Member States, that de 
facto or de jure multilateral agreements frame the States’ sovereignty. The “regime” which is 
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characteristic of international reality, emphasized by Stephen Krasner3, (a collection of rules 
and formal or informal norms) is a reality which affects the sovereignty of all States.
4 Is there a convergence between the United States and the European Union?
Even though, as Keohane emphasizes, sovereignty has evolved differently in the USA 
and Europe, to what extent, despite the differences we have previously discussed, are we 
not witnessing a movement over the long-term towards a single model for sovereignty in an 
increasingly interdependent world influenced by globalization? Such a hypothesis is a priori 
supported by two factors, namely the history of the USA and Europe on one hand, and analyses 
of contemporary international realities on the other. On reading Robert Keohane’s article, we 
cannot but ask to what extent, from an historical point of view, has the United States of 
today reached a state of (unitary) sovereignty which has already been passed by the European 
States, and which might be followed by other evolutionary stages? The American Civil War in 
the 19th century contributed to the republic’s passage from external to unitary sovereignty. We 
can see the same impact caused by wars through history in European States such as France, 
Spain and Germany.
Furthermore, in the modern world, international relations are already influenced by a 
shared political framework: the State and sovereignty. Nevertheless, despite the differences 
between the American approach (unitary sovereignty) and the European approach (pooled 
sovereignty) which we have highlighted above, to what extent are these differences so far apart 
in reality? The similarities already highlighted between the two sides of the Atlantic contribute 
to bringing these perspectives closer together. Even in the United States sovereignty is not 
absolute; it has never been so. Just as in the EU, sovereignty in the USA is subject to increasing 
limitations, particularly as regards autonomy (cfr Krasner). In both economic and security 
matters, whether they be classical issues such as threats posed by States to one another, or 
more recent issues such as international terrorism, the USA cannot tackle such challenges 
alone. Finally, just as is the case within the EU, the USA exhibits a strong resistance to anything 
which might detract from sovereignty in two particular areas: foreign policy and justice.
5 Towards a return to a joint sovereignty model? On what basis?
What picture do these observations of the United States and Europe paint for us of 
the modern reality of sovereignty? The analyses converge upon the growing pressure 
exerted by the international system upon States: economic globalization and security issues, 
interdependence, etc. Such pressures constitute constraints upon States which must face a 
crisis of transformation (McCarthy and Jones, 1995; Bordoni, 2013). State actors themselves 
3 The «regime» is defined by Stephen Krasner as «principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area» (Krasner, 1995, 1).
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conclude by explicitly acknowledging the increasingly restrictive nature of the international 
framework. This is particularly evident in economic matters when, in the UN’s September 2005 
“World Summit Outcome Document”, the signatories highlight in particular: “That the increasing 
interdependence of national economies in a globalizing world and the emergence of rule-based 
regimes for international economic relations have meant that the space for national economic 
policy, that is, the scope for domestic policies, especially in the areas of trade, investment and 
industrial development, is now often framed by international disciplines, commitments and global 
market considerations.” (Nations Unies, 2005) Nevertheless, despite this joint framework, we 
have already emphasized how much certain States could claim unitary sovereignty more credibly 
than others, but subject to one main condition: being sufficiently powerful. As a consequence 
this implies that the modern world, characterized by a hierarchy of power, from a “realist” 
perspective, is also a world characterized by different degrees of State sovereignty (both 
informal and formal), with certain States asserting themselves as more sovereign than others. 
During those last two years, Iraq or Syria do not enjoy the same degree of sovereignty as the 
United States.
In this context, what would a hypothetical sole model for sovereignty look like? It is 
important straight away to consider this hypothesis more as an analytical ideal, rather than a 
reality.
a)   The main characteristic of this model resides in the political regime highlighted in the 
international system. The modern political world is marked by references to democracy. 
A State is more easily accepted or recognized as sovereign if it claims to be democratic. 
Democracy is adopted or desired or presented as an example to be followed. In its wider 
sense, democracy is linked to an open society and to the principle of accountability.
b)   In the same vein, the modern international agenda is not only constituted of power 
struggles. It also deals with values and challenges: human rights, the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women,... which are advanced as norms to be followed by all 
State actors.
c)   Sovereignty is and will remain influenced, or constricted even, by the impact of the 
market economy which, since the end of the cold war, has been established in all 
States. This type of economy appears to be a double-edged sword for the modern 
State. The expansion of the market economy on a global scale makes the international 
community more integrated and prosperous. Yet, at the same time, it contributes to 
the crises of States overtaken by economic movements whose scale exceeds their 
control, and therefore their sovereignty. In this regard, the market economy appears 
to maintain an ambivalent relationship with sovereignty. On the one hand the free 
market, being free competition which requires the abolition of borders and constraints 
of all kinds thereby contributing to a Hobbesian logic relating to the fight between 
competing economic rivals to survive, is dominant. By calling for the abolition of 
borders and the development of market freedom, economic actors create an anarchical 
international system, in the Hobbesian sense of the term, which is in principal contrary 
to sovereignty. On the other hand, as Peter Evans emphasizes (Evans, 1992), economic 
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actors such as multinational companies need States capable in particular of offering 
bodies to whom they can make legal appeals in the event of disputes. From this 
perspective, sovereignty remains necessary. The balance will oscillate towards or away 
from sovereignty depending upon the prevailing economic concepts. 
d)   Sovereignty is also called into question by joint international or even global issues: 
security, energy, environment, water, etc. Just as has been set out above in relation to 
economic matters, such issues constitute challenges which are beyond any isolated 
State’s capacities for intervention or control.
e)   The debate on sovereignty is strongly influenced by the phenomenon of globalization. 
In this respect, we should highlight how much the process of globalizations and 
multiple fragmentations exist concurrently in the international system. These two 
movements can be linked4. Expressed simply, there are three types of relationship 
between globalization and fragmentation, each entailing a particular attitude to 
sovereignty: 
—   Globalization can create fragmentations which rival globalization by way of reaction 
to the same. These defensive fragmentations can provoke two different attitudes 
towards sovereignty: either that globalization, as a result of opposition (as in the 
case of a nationalist reflex), generates a call for a return to unitary sovereignty 
in a search for a new balance between the local and the global; or it encourages 
movement towards pooled sovereignty (as in the case of external commercial 
constraints stimulating European integration).
—   Other fragmentations can be linked to globalization (e.g.: regional economic 
groupings such as the ASEAN and NAFTA, which subscribe to the idea of free 
movement of goods and economic integration). Here again there are two possible 
consequences for sovereignty: either, as has been set out above, a call for more 
sovereignty or support for shared sovereignty. 
—   Finally, certain fragmentations can simultaneously defend against and be allied 
to globalization. The preservation of specific regional interests (e.g. the European 
Union’s common agricultural policy) does not constitute a challenge to the 
principle of globalization which is otherwise wished for. In such a case, the actors’ 
attitude will fluctuate between the three types of sovereignty according to the 
circumstances.
f)   Despite or thanks to the fragmentations in accordance with the type of relations they 
have with globalization, modern issues which have increased in size require responses 
from ever larger and/or more powerful policy units, whether they be States (USA, 
Russia, China, India,...) attached to unitary sovereignty, or regional groups (EU) 
practicing joint sovereignty, coming into existence in those States as a means of 
compensating for the loss of ability to claim unitary sovereignty credibly. This idea can 
be expressed by the formula: “the bigger, the more sovereign”.
4 The concurrence of the globalisation and fragmentation phenomena is highlighted by James Rosenau in particular, who uses 
the term “fragmentation” when he observes the integration and division movements within the modern international system 
(Rosenau, 1999).
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6 Conclusions
The preceding observations on the features of contemporary sovereignty provide us with 
a contrasting image. Certain features (democratic regime, values, shared global challenges) 
appear to lead to a sole sovereignty model. Conversely others, in particular the market economy, 
are loaded with contradictory leanings. No doubt sovereignty is now subject to more adverse 
pressure than in the past, making research into a coherent vision more difficult. The question 
of sovereignty is made more complex by the different degrees of sovereignty held by States 
in the world, which are the products of historical evolution, modern circumstances and the 
people responsible for policies’ own ideas. However convergences and divergences in sovereignty 
contribute to its transformation, from external to unitary sovereignty for some, from unitary 
to pooled sovereignty for others. This movement of transformation constitutes a characteristic 
idea of sovereignty in as much as it is an evolving social construct by nature. 
By accepting that sovereignty is a social construct, this contribution allows us to discuss 
the relationships which can exist between the idea of the State and sovereignty, as well as 
the impact exerted upon sovereignty by external constraints. The evolution of sovereignty 
therefore appears as that resulting in particular from the idea of the State, its power and the 
way its policy directors react to external constraints. However, it is not possible at this stage 
to evaluate whether one of these elements has dominion over the others. Doubtless we will 
observe different chemistry at work in different cases, each being particular to the outcome of 
the interactions between its three elements to which intra-State factors must be added. The 
difficulty in understanding the substance of sovereignty in all its complexity which is the result 
of numerous factors is demonstrated by Biersteker and Weber when they observe that:
The modern state system is not based on some timeless principle of sovereignty, but on the 
production of a normative conception that links authority, territory, population (society, 
nation), and recognition in a unique way and in a particular place (the state). Attempting to 
realize this ideal entails a great deal of hard work on the part of statespersons, diplomats, 
and intellectuals: to establish and police practices consistent with the ideal, its components, 
and the links between them; to delegitimize and quash challenges or threats; and to paper 
over persistent anomalies to make them appear to be consistent with the ideal or temporary 
divergences from the diachronic trajectory toward a pristine Westphalian ideal. The ideal of 
state sovereignty is a product of the actions of powerful agents and the resistance to those 
actions by those located at the margins of power. (Biesterker and Weber, 1996, 3).
All of the foregoing leads us to think that, in a context where, on the one hand, even 
for the most powerful States such as the USA or China, there is no such thing as absolute 
sovereignty. On the other hand, in a globalization and fragmentation context, on one side and 
a context of crisis of the State on the other, it is possible to advance the following hypothesis: 
to what extent, simultaneously taking into account evolutions from history and the modern 
world, in particular the growing pressure of the international system, are we seeing the rise of a 
type of sovereignty distributed across multiple power levels: local, regional intra-State, national, 
supra-State, a “multilevel sovereignty”, which is possibly uniform but more likely multifaceted? 
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The gradual emergence of a type of sovereignty distributed across multiple levels contributes, 
furthermore, to assisting the State in resolving the crisis it is experiencing. Indeed there are 
many States which, under the constraint of external and internal pressures, are looking to end 
their crisis by redistributing State competencies between different levels of power. A possible 
alternative to the multilevel sovereignty hypothesis might be to consider the movement which 
can be seen in Europe of passage from unitary sovereignty towards pooled sovereignty as 
representing the likely evolution of other sovereignties which are still unitary, a step which 
Europe has made in advance of the rest of the world, as it were. In particular this raises the 
issue of the link between sovereignty and governance which would merit study elsewhere.
Observations resulting from a comparison between the European and American positions 
cause the following question to reappear: whether States are large or small, is it possible 
to avoid convergence towards a single or shared model? In any event, under the current 
circumstances, the United States (and other significant powers) can doubtless claim unitary 
sovereignty for longer and more credibly than other States, but this is subject to increasing 
restrictions and cannot go on indefinitely.
Finally, two points must be emphasized. First of all, arguments against the emergence 
of a sole sovereignty model distributed across multiple levels remain to be assessed. It 
is important, for example, to acknowledge that there are, today and will be in the future, 
geopolitical conflicts of interest which are likely to cause defensive retreats to unitary 
sovereignty, or to ask what the impact of the identity challenges which a priori contribute 
further to the strengthening of unitary sovereignty will be. Also, in the same vein, this 
comparison of this paper principally concerned two democratic groups. It therefore does not 
make predictions concerning the relationships to be assessed between other political regimes 
(authoritarian, totalitarian) and sovereignty.
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